

EVALUATING THE EVALUATORS: WHEN ACADEMIC CITIZENSHIP FAILS

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Motivation

The experiment of the state agency to create the community of experts to help the state to reduce the number of low-quality higher education institutions.

What was the motivation of academics who have volunteered to be an expert?

Why have some academics become enforcers of a system many of them consider as absurd?


Extra-role vs. In-role behaviors

Our starting point is to divide individual performance into two dimensions: *in-role performance* and *extra-role performance*.

In-role performance involves behaviors which are the part of the organization's core activity. It includes the primary task requirements for doing which individuals are paid for.

Extra-role performance involves behaviors that could be useful for the organization but are not usually listed in an individual's job description and as a condition of employment (Bergeron 2007; Farris 2018; Van Dyne, Cummings, and Parks 1995).

Academic Service



Trade-off

- Not only economic resources are scarce but also other resources such as time are also limited.
- Even the tasks inside in-role performance compete to each other.
- There is a trade-off between in-role and extra-role performance.
- Spending time on one activity necessarily comes at the expense of another.

Proposition

The previous study suggests that spending more time on extra-role tasks may have negative consequences on the core task performance.

What if the causal link is reversed?

Individuals who have lower performance in core tasks will be engaged more in academic citizenship than individuals who have relatively higher level of performance.

The main question

Is it true that academics less productive in publications and citations are more likely to become the expert engaged in the regulatory activity?

Background information

- In 2013 the state agency started a campaign to 'clean the system of higher education' by reducing the number of ineffective institutions.
- The Ministry develops a methodology to evaluate the performance of educational organizations.
- The Ministry has information about dozens of metrics for hundreds of universities which officially used in the decision to inspect a university more closely.
- The inspection is conducted by the group of people consisted of federal inspector and experts who are supposed to represent an academic community.
- The state agency does not have strong barriers possible to prevent low-quality experts. Requirements for the application are an undergraduate degree and two years of work experience in an educational organization. The next step is to pass a qualification examination.

Data and methods

- The data on experts are taken from the list of certified experts: 788 people
- Data on publications and citations from Russian Index of Science Citation (554 experts were identified).
 - RISC launched in 2005 with the support of the state.
 - the RISC Core includes journals indexed by the Russian Science Citation Index on the Web of Science platform and Russian journals indexed in the Web of Science Core Collection or Scopus (1079).
- One-to-many matching procedure: sex, year of first publication, university participating in Russian Excellence Initiative (project "5-100"), and academic discipline (social science and humanities or other).

Results

- Most of the accredited expert works in universities: 707 experts (89.7%) work in 355 universities.
- They are more likely to have administrative positions related with the quality of education: 35% of experts in their universities are the part of special office engaged in maintaining the standards of educational activities.
- Experts, whose positions are related only to teaching and research are much less common.

Results

- The significant number of experts represent the universities that are recognized as inefficient in education: 32% for the year 2014, 44% for 2015.
- Only 11% of experts work in strong universities, whereas 20% of all academics represent strong institutions.
- 32% of academics represent universities with number publications higher than the median value of the best universities (15 publications per 100 academics), the share of experts is much lower - 8%.

Results

Variable	Min		Median		Mean		Max	
	expert	non-experts	expert	non-experts	expert	non-experts	expert	non-experts
Number of papers in RISC	0	0	32	18	45.65	33.48	320	783
Number of papers in core-RISC	0	0	1	1	5.73	7.29	235	747
Number of citations in RISC	0	0	75	40	222.17	202.45	4951	35904
Number of citations in core-RISC	0	0	3	2	24.11	54.69	1530	32843

Indicators

- percentage of papers in RCSI Core over all papers published by the author;
- percentage of citations in RSCI Core over all citations;
- weighted-average impact factor of journals where papers were published;
- weighted-average impact factor of journals where papers were cited;
- percentage of papers in international journals;
- percentage of citations from international journals;
- percentage of documents in journals approved by Higher Attestation Commission (VAK).

Results

Variable	Median		Average treatment effect (Δ)
	experts	non-experts	
pct. papers RISC Core	2.78	3.31	-9.69***
pct. citations RISC Core	2.66	4.08	-8.90***
Impact factor published	0.285	0.287	-0.08***
Impact factor cited	0.307	0.308	-0.10***
pct. papers in international journals	0	0	-4.09***
pct. citations from international journals	1.1	1	-4.53***
pct. papers VAK journals	42.05	38.6	1.53

Conclusion

- Russian academics who performed lower in respect with publications and citations in the selective journals are more likely to become an expert engaged in academic citizenship in the form of regulatory activity.
- The universities could support this sort of academic citizenship because they consider the experts as insiders of the system who can acquire knowledge how to get successfully through inspections.

Limitations

- The nature of the data does not allow us to determine whether all of them actually participated in the inspections, and also to identify those who participate more often than others.
- The data do not allow analyzing the exact time when the individual started to be listed as expert. There is still some possibility that academics did not differ in their research performance at the time of starting the career of expert but this new responsibility affected on further achievements.

Q & A

Moskaleva et al., 2018

Available data:	Problems and preferences:
eLibrary total	A lot of documents without full data (references absent) or excluded from RISC for different misleading publication policies
RISC total	A lot of sources with insufficient quality
RISC journals	Full texts, full metadata, full references
Russian “VAK” journals	Mainly formal criteria for inclusion of journals to this list
RISC Core	Journals with approved quality
Only WoS CC and Scopus journals	Underestimation of research in Social Sciences and Humanities in Russian language

The number of institutions is decreasing, the number of inspections is increasing

