

**SUSPECTING THE PROFESSOR: WHY
FORMAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
ARE PLAYING SUCH A ROLE IN RUSSIAN
ACADEMIA?**

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THE AUTHORITARIAN MODERNIZATION IN RUSSIAN ACADEMIA

Appointed, rather than elected, administrators (rectors – since 2006, presidents of the RAS – since 2013)

Regulation of dissertation production (new Regulations – 2002, 2006, 2013)

New licensure and accreditation rules (since 2011)

Institutional reviews (RAS institutional reviews – since 2008; university efficiency evaluation / excellence frameworks - since 2011-2012)

Effective contracts (administrators, workers - since 2014)

New grant programmes (*megagranty*, RSF)

THE BUILDING BLOCS FOR NEW INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS

Appointment, rather than election or cooptation (academic administrators, members of expert councils)

Formal requirements towards decision-makers, workers, and applicants (often involving publications in specific editions in addition to degrees)

Formal requirements towards resource allocation decision procedures (involving complex metrics)

CASE 1: THE EVOLUTION OF DISSERTATION REGULATION


Increasing publicness of events (public announcements, obligatory publications)

Isolating process participants (no working contacts between the dissertation author and opponents / *veduschaja organizatsija*)

Involving new recommenders, preferably structurally dissociated (journal editors, members of standing committee)

Introducing formal qualifications towards organization to which the council is attached / council members

THE BASES OF TRUST



CASE 2. THE CITATION INDEXES

Recommenders (editors, citers) structurally dissociated

Citers are (generally) isolated in network terms

Recommenders are (presumably) unaware of consequences of their acts


Citations leave material traces which could be subject of inspection

WHY SOME SYSTEMS ARE RELYING ON INSPECTABLE INDICATORS MORE THAN OTHERS?

STRUCTURAL REASONS: NECESSITY TO ACCOUNT FOR DECISIONS

- Modernizing role of the state
- Weakness of communities
- Moral justifications
- Double responsibility

CULTURAL ROOTS: “BAD GOVERNANCE” AS A FOLK THEORY



THE CONSEQUENCES

Goal displacement (Espland and Sauder, 2007)

Resource (mis)allocation

Industrialization

Bureaucratic dichromatism

Down edge alignment

Gaming

Moral crisis

BAD GOVERNANCE IN ACADEMIA AS A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY

Pluralistic ignorance (Prentice and Miller, 1990) and normality of deviant behavior (Banfield, 1958)

Moral justifications

Symbol devaluation

Complexity of procedures and the quest for efficient solutions

QUESTIONS UNANSWERED

Was there bad governance before we learned about it?

Have they achieved what they intended to achieve?

тонны никому не нужных, бесполезных и вредных бумаг



высокая нагрузка (превышающая мировую как минимум в 3 раза)



низкие зарплаты



попытка заменить академическую свободу формальными показателями (индексы Хирша, количество публикаций в Скопусах и т.д.)



краткосрочные контракты



отсутствие выборности ректоров, выстраивание вертикали власти, отстранение НПР от управления университетом

